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The Strategies used by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Management of Conflicts within the Horn of Africa: Focus on the Larger Sudan

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Abstract

The Horn of Africa has for decades been embroiled in various conflicts some of them being of very high magnitude creating unrest, forced migration, death and poverty among the citizenry hence attracting international as well as regional concerns, thus various supra institutions such as the EU and the UN as well as regional organizations such as IGAD have played very important roles through their participation in trying to find lasting solutions to the various conflicts through conflict management, peace keeping and peace enforcement where need be. The objective of the study was, the strategies being used by the intergovernmental authority on development (IGAD) in the management of conflicts within the Horn of Africa with the larger Sudan being the case study. The research question was what are the strategies being used by the intergovernmental authority on development (IGAD) in the management of conflicts within the Horn of Africa with the larger Sudan being the case study? This study would help formulate policies regarding the mediation process, conflict management and the role of regional organizations as mediators, while acting as scholarly reference material. The scope of the study was on Inter-Governmental Authority for Development's function on mediation in the Sudan. It may be limited to the activities 1956 to 2015. The researcher adopted Descriptive and Historical designs. Both quantitative and qualitative Data were collected through interview schedules and questionnaire at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IGAD liaison office and embassies of the member states. The study focused on the conflict management, significant in view of the long-standing historical questions that have led to the hardening of positions that make the North antagonistic to the South as contentious issues are played out in religious, racial and economic terms. The study paid attention to ethical guidelines and considerations. The study identified the strategies used by IGAD in the management of the Greater Sudan conflict, namely the engagement of a personality mediator, round table negotiations, coercive diplomacy, peacekeeping and enforcement, good office for good works and state and non-state actors. The study recommended that IGAD has to avoid the competition of who carries out mediation and instead pool their resources especially human resources. Identify the weaknesses within their strategies with a purpose of eliminating the drawbacks that has created a reoccurrence of the conflict in Sudan. Trust is vital in personality mediation. Both parties have to trust the mediator that their issues will be taken into consideration and that the outcome of the mediation will be a win, win situation.

Key words: Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Sudan, Conflict, Strategies, Horn of Africa

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Introduction

Conflict management has not only been an issue of two states finding a solution, it has become the business of the international community that brings on board international, continental and sub-regional organizations together to resolve intra and interstate conflicts. These institutions are mainly backed by international law through various charters, most importantly the United Nations charter that all nations globally abide to. After the World War II, intra and interstate conflicts globally has witnessed the involvement of the UN either directly by sending envoys and mediators or indirectly by empowering regional and continental organizations to resolve emerging conflicts.

The Horn of Africa consists of the countries that lie on the eastern most extension of African land. These countries include Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan and South Sudan. Some scholars also include Kenya and Uganda on the belief that their cultures have been linked throughout their long history (Iyob, 2000). In this way, broadly defined, the Horn of Africa includes North Eastern part of Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the larger Sudan. The Horn of Africa is endowed with enormous natural resources such as oil, gold, coal, natural gas and petroleum. The Horn of Africa is believed to be the region with one of the largest oil deposits in the world. Accordingly, companies from other nations especially Asia and Europe are hunting the oil in the region according to (Markakis, 1994). From oil, the countries in the region are expected to have high levels of investment in the world. However, these countries have been thrown into conflicts based on oil resource as one of the causes of conflicts among others.

Human rights are universal basic entitlements that each individual is entitled to by the virtue that, he or she is a human being. Such include right to life, own property, identity, freedom of association, movement, self- determination, freedom of expression, way of worship, speech among others. It is the responsibility of the state to ensure that individual human rights are safeguarded to ensure health welfare in the society. On the other hand, the citizens have the responsibility to ensure that they do not violate each other's rights, Woodward, P. (1996). When these entitlements are taken away then conflict ensues as has been evident in the countries in the horn particularly the Sudan.

In terms of contextualizing Sudan, it is occupied by people of varying ethnic origins. In the north are the Arabs who are in two groups namely the original Arabs and the Arabicized Africans (Nubians, Miseriea, and Dafurians among others). The problem in the north is the discrimination of the black Arabs by those that are referred to as the 'true Arabs'. In the South among the many ethnic groupings are two main ones namely the Dinka where the late Dr. John Garang and the current president Salvar Kiir hail from. According to Simon (1995), it is evident that some other parts of Africa became commonplace, for civil wars and intra-factional conflicts

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have at one time or other subsumed the unity and strength of the liberation movements in Sudan. The major contenders in the liberation struggle in Sudan were mainly the SPLM/SPLA among others. The Southern Sudan Independent and the Movement/Army (SSIM/A) were also largely engaged in the struggle as well as the Patriotic Resistance Movement of Southern Sudan (PRMSS). The Southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SSPLM)/Anyanya Two, and the Nuba Mountains Solidarity (NMS) were also not left out. The 1991 split which occurred between John Garang (Dinka) and Riek Machar (Nuer), the who were predominantly the main leaders within the SPLA/SPLM factions led to factional fighting and the formation of the SPLA-Mainstream, in which case the Torit Group was led by Garang while the SPLA-United primarily the Nasir Group was led by Machar. Inevitably, the split caused a major rift within the movement and thousands were killed and over 300,000 were displaced between the years 1991 and 1993. The rift between the two leaders namely Garang and Marshal was largely due to personal grounds and a contest for the control of the movement.

The inhabitants of the Horn of Africa vary. For example, there is a composition of large population of Christians and Muslims but many others follow other religions such as traditionalist, animists and pagans. The Christians and Muslims are the most affected with religious wars. Somalia on the other hand has complicated history, culture language and religion. While divisions are not as great as in Ethiopia, many factors such as clan rivalries, economic pressure and political stress divide Somalia. Djibouti on her own part is an interturing area because it is a conflict scene between Ethiopia and Somalia and national lacking identity according to Swain (1997). As much as these are interstate conflicts, the Sudan has not had pronounced interstate conflicts most of the conflicts, however, in the larger Sudan have been intrastate conflicts until when IGAD engaged in the management of the Sudan conflict and the larger Sudan was divided into two states. The efforts of IGAD cannot be underestimated although the process did not solve all the underlying issues creating intrastate conflicts in the larger Sudan, and subsequently between the separate states of the Sudan and the South Sudan.

This study analyses conflicts in various dimensions, for instance conflict is the incompatibility of goals, objectives or interests between two or more persons, groups, parties or even states. It is inevitable that men can stay from engaging in fighting or quarrelling, meaning that even when men may not necessarily engage in militarized conflict, at least from time to time, human beings will engage in non-militarized conflict even though they do not possess arms or when the tools of violence are not around; and as Morgenthau (1948) states, when there are no weapons to fight, men can even use their bare fists.

Objective:

To assess the strategies being used by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the management of the Sudan conflict.

Statement of the Problem

The Sudanese conflict began in 1956 immediately after attaining independence, according to a survey of the United Nations on the effect of the conflict and civil war on the Sudan populace, between the year 2002 and 2011, about two and a half million people were killed, while one

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million, eight hundred people were displaced. In some areas, villages were burnt down and the women were raped and their children burned to death. At some point, some families were forced into cannibalism.

According to Oslo (2009), Africa's longest civil war has claimed nearly five million deaths since it began. This conflict became internationalized across the region and several efforts made by successive Sudanese governments and other actors to resolve the conflict failed. The failure led the Sudan government (GoS) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to invite IGAD regional organization in 1993 to help, as explained by Hilde F. Johnson (2011), However, even with the intervention of IGAD, attempts to build a lasting peace agreement have faltered. The question therefore being, why hasn't IGAD effectively succeeded in the management of the Sudan conflict? IGAD facilitated the agreement on the resolution of the conflict that was signed by the political actors, though some of them lacked political good will. The study sought to understand the strategies of IGAD in the management of conflict in the horn of Africa with specific reference to the greater Sudan region. It explored the complex nature of the Sudan civil war and conflict, the strategies that IGAD used and outlined the challenges it encountered in the management of the Sudan conflict.

The focus of the research was to examine the IGAD peace building strategies in the management of the conflict in the horn of Africa with specific reference to the greater Sudan region, the nature of the conflict and the challenges that IGAD has to contend with in the pursuit for peace within the region. Although it appreciated prior works of IGAD in the mediation processes in Sudan, the study identified several gaps that were to be the core of its investigation which include contextualizing the nature of conflict in relation to IGAD's effort to manage it, vis a vis other actors including the African Union and the United Nations. It also assessed the IGAD's strategies, successes and failures in its intervention in the management of the Sudan conflict and it eventually analyzed the challenges facing IGAD in its intervention. These areas formed the major gaps of the study.

As much as there was a lot of engagement of IGAD in the management of the Sudan conflict, it is possible that sustainable peace was not achieved in Sudan, because acrimonious engagements among various groups was evident that positive peace was not fully realized, even after the larger Sudan was divided with South Sudan becoming an independent state. The effort put in place by IGAD to see the division of the two nation states is remarkable; however, the ethnical and political turmoil experienced from time to time explains that positive peace is far from reach.

In view of the above, there is therefore the need to investigate, in which areas did IGAD give more concentration in the Sudan peace process than other areas. For example, although IGAD dealt with issues regarding the restoration of peace and security in the Sudan, it did not deal with the root causes of the Sudan conflict, for example the historical injustices matted upon the people of Sudan particularly the Southerners by the Sudan government as well as the negative ethnicity between the Dinka and the Nuer in South Sudan. It is important to note that ethnic affiliation and the value for culture rather than economics are central in the politics within the black Africa societies and therefore, any avenue to alter them either by internal or

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external powers would be considered as having contravened the very existence of the African societies, which would result into conflict.

Review of Related Literature

This chapter looked at the strategies that were employed by IGAD in the management of the Sudan Conflict. The chapter interrogated these strategies in three broad forms: soft power and hard power also referred to as track two, as well as a combination of the two, which in the diplomatic circles is referred to as track one and a half diplomacy.

Diplomatic Circles in Conflict Management

Joseph Nye (1990) explains that soft power is the ability to attract and co-opt. soft power involves shaping the preferences of others through appeal and attraction, a tool that IGAD effectively used. Under the soft power strategies adopted included personality mediation, round table diplomacy and office for good works. While hard power strategies included peace keeping and peace enforcement and ceasefire. In hard power strategy which refers to track two diplomacy, States may involve their diplomats in a conflict in order to support one or more of the direct parties to the conflict, like the support given to the retired General Lazarus Sumbeiyu by the Kenya government to spearhead the management of the Sudan conflict under the auspices of the IGAD prompting the researcher to visit the retired General for insight on the study.

Further to this effort, the track one and a half was also used which entailed the carrot and stick diplomacy to fasten the process of the negotiation when one party seemed to delay in decision making or acting towards the greater good of ending the stalemate in the management of the Sudan conflict. The study discussed these strategies as independent themes basically for purposes of analysis although they are intertwined. The chapter further provides an interpretation through graphs and charts as it corroborates primary and secondary data, followed by a summary.

Houston and Bercovitch (2000) argue that conflict is one of the most pervasive and inevitable features of all social systems, however simple or complex they may be and irrespective of their location in time and space. They point out that there are a number of ways of dealing with or managing conflict; they range from avoidance to withdrawal, through bilateral negotiation, to various forms of third-party intervention. Although Mamdani (2010) supports this argument by indicating that mediation, which is non-binding and non-coercive, is as old as conflict itself. Nyong'o (1991) points out that systematic analysis, let alone empirical studies, of third-party intervention in general and mediation in particular has been very rare, thus leading to poor understanding of the phenomenon.

The success of IGAD is observed from diverse dimensions, one of the main aspects being that the two parties who had never sat before to negotiate peacefully, had for the first time managed to sit together, and engage directly with each other, courtesy of the IGAD intervention. More so, the nation of Sudan which had fought against itself for so many years, past a century with different ethnic affiliations namely the Arabs and the Africans was able to divide and South Sudan was born, being a notable landmark which depicts the effort and the success in the management of the Sudan conflict.

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Personality Mediation

Mediation is an act of intervention in a conflict or dispute by a third party or an outside power to improve the chances of resolving the conflict, Mediation usually seeks to engage the adversaries' in constructive dialogue, initiate negotiations between antagonists, or break a deadlock in negotiations. A mediator may be an individual, a small group of individuals, an organization, or a government. All of them, however, must share an interest in resolving the conflict.

The issue of personality mediation has been seen to yield fruit within the African context in a conflict situation. An example of this mediation is the role of the late former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan in Kenya in 2007/8 during the Post-Election Violence, also, in South Africa during apartheid. Bishop Desmond Tutu was very instrumental in engaging the government and the black population at the beginning and the end of TJRC which was formed in South Africa after many blacks were killed by the regime. Bishop Desmond Tutu found it necessary to engage the two parties through a TJRC to end pain and revenge. In this study it was found that personality mediation through IGAD was employed.

This study relied on in depth interview in discussing personality mediation. Besides, it appreciates the view of the respondents which was at 80% that personality mediation was crucial in resolving the Sudan conflict. This revealed the importance of General Lazarus Sumbeiyi who took the center stage in mediating between the two conflicting parties. They also noted other personality mediators such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ibrahim Babagida of Nigeria as well as Milton Obote of Uganda were quite meaningful before the intervention of IGAD because they played a role in creating a road map though loosely established, that would be used as a pathway for further engagement.

One interviewee noted that Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida, as chairman of OAU, took the lead in holding peace talks in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, in May-June 1992. With a weakened rebel movement represented by factions led by Dr. Riek Machar and Dr. John Garang, an increasingly confident Government of Sudan delegation espoused majority rule, which, it held, meant that the constitution should be based on *sharia*, although the south could be exempt from the *hudud* (code of Islamic punishments).

As Hilde, (2011) stated that Ibrahim Babaginda, the then president of Nigeria, realized that the engagement between the interests between the warring parties were based on very divergent views and that none of the groups was willing to yield some ground, therefore he considered it necessary to call for a second round of negotiations although there was the fear that the SPLM/A was on the verge of collapse. The main reason why Babaginda considered a second round of negotiations was because he took note on the importance of the issues of race, religion and self-determination that were at the core of the Sudan conflict. The two factions of the SPLM/A pressed for a secular democratic system and the right of the south through a referendum for self-determination, even though a communiqué indicating some modest progress was issued at the end of the negotiations Khartoum rejected secularism and would not countenance the proposed referendum. The talks rapidly collapsed.

Joppe, (2008) explains that almost a year passed before Babangida called for a second round of talks at Abuja in April-May 1993, by which time the SPLM/A was weaker militarily. However, the interest of the Khartoum government was to derail the peace process and therefore

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Khartoum proposed power-sharing and balanced development, rejected secession, and proposed a constitution that did not refer to Islam as the state religion and exempted the south from certain provisions. The sharia law was rejected by the SPLM/A. The SPLM/As interest was that the southerners in the Nuba Mountains, the Abyei and the Southern Blue Nile be allowed to vote to become separate states from the North. There were other differences between the parties, but the critical issues of the separation of state and religion and self-determination proved conclusive in causing the collapse of the negotiations.

According to Kipyegon (2018), the very inception of the IGAD driven peace process in September 1993 saw it accorded legitimacy and support by the international community including the United Nations. IGAD spent considerable time and effort in trying to gain western material and political support, and this eventually took the form of the IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF), formerly known as the Friends of IGAD. According to one of the respondents, although the US and other non-European countries were also part of the IPF, the support of the UK, Norway, France and Italy, the EU and UNDP, and the US is what breathed life into the faltering IGAD peace process, and their sustained engagement proved critical to the breakthrough of the CPA .

The study established that Sumbeiygo as an important mediator enabled the two parties who had not engaged before to come together and be able to bring out issues of contention which were needed to be unearthed for the peace process to begin. He was also able to persuade some of the people who would be key for the peace process such as the vice president of Sudan, Osman Ali Taha who would be able to articulate the issues and interests of Sudan independently even in the absence of the president Omar Ali Bashir.

The study observes that optimism expressed by the citizens in Sumbeiygo's ability to broker peace persuaded him to realize the urgency of pursuing the roadmap to peace in Sudan. Sumbeiygo was aware that the situation in Sudan was not unique since the image of Africa as a continent was languishing in endless conflicts and this etched on the minds of many people like him. According to the study, what made Sumbeiygo succeed was his realization that Sudan had undergone brutal bloodshed and invited the intervention of the international community and other actors who had achieved little success. In his mediation Sumbeiygo maintained that Sudan's solutions to its problems rested with the Sudanese.

The study findings tended to agree with IGAD, (2014) that personality mediation was the most successful within the African continent with the example of the late and former General Secretary of the United Nations, Kofi Annan in Kenya during the 2007 – 2008 general election conflict. Angoma (2014) talks of other personalities in the Sudan conflict such as Milton Obote of the present Uganda who sought to mediate the Sudan conflict in 1963 but not much development towards peace was achieved. Obote who took part in several reconciliation attempts in Sudan may have been motivated to intervene due to the large number of Southern Sudanese refugees in Uganda, some of whom were using Uganda as a launching pad to stage raids into Sudan.

According to Blanchard (2014), Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana also offered mediation assistance to the Sudan Peace process due to a motivation by his perceived Pan-Africanism and consequent desire to provide leadership in solving the continent's problems. This offer was

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however, turned down by president Maghoub (of Sudan then) on the grounds that the southern problem was an internal Sudan affair. The study established that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had intervened in the Sudanese civil war and conflict from as early as 1993 with the formation of the Sub-Committee on Peace in the Sudan. General Sumbeiywo enjoyed the support of this committee which was entrusted with the responsibility of ending the conflict through a negotiated settlement.

The study established that as much as General Lazarus Sumbeiywo enjoyed good relations with the Kenyan government as well as his relationship with the former president Daniel Arap Moi, the study sought to explore the personal traits of the General as well as his long experience as a military officer, which demonstrates that because of his strong Christian background and commitment as well as his enduring distinguished career in the military, these two combinations gave him a strong backing when it came to engage the two warring parties and was able to bring the two together to arrive to the talks, as respondents said that General Lazarus was a very committed Christian whose integrity was unquestionable and he was able to treat everyone equally and with respect to all without discrimination.

According to the study findings, personality mediation has been a very successful method within Africa in times of conflict and peace processes and therefore needs to be enhanced as pathways of finding peace in the event of conflict, be it militarized or non-militarized. It is however important to note that the personality mediation involved in this kind of an engagement cannot work in isolation without the involvement of other actors, say the antagonists and the protagonists who should be right at the middle of the mediation process to be able to arrive to a meaningful solution.

As Paffenholz, (2003) puts it that if the conflicting parties do not find a middle ground to resolve the issues at hand, it becomes difficult for peace to be realized because they are the ones that understand their problem more than the outsiders as was the case of Sudan which could be understood more clearly by the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A. It was the people of the South who understood the extent to which they had been suppressed by the Government and hence the urgency to get into a negotiating table to end the conflict and draw a road map to attain peace.

According to Mulugeta (2009), in the Kenyan case of the 2007/2008 general election conflict, it was the Government and the opposition that understood the issue more than the mediator therefore, if they failed to engage with each other with the help of the mediator, and then it would have been very difficult to realize peace. There is therefore the need to agree to engage in dialogue to be able to overcome the stalemate.

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their choice. Further, Chapter 8, Articles 52 and 53 affirms that the Security Council may utilize such regional arrangements or agencies to achieve pacific

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settlement of local disputes on the initiative of the parties' concerned (UN Charter, 2013 pp 155).

Further, it was through the IPF that IGAD endeavored to ensure that all mediation efforts would be coordinated and that the international community would not endorse other peace processes. For instance, after Egypt and Libya launched their joint peace initiative in 1999 aimed at drawing some of the northern political parties back into government as a moderating influence on the National Islamic Front (NIF), Kenya, which was chairing the IGAD process, got worried. In July 2001 the former president Moi of Kenya wrote to presidents Mubarak of Egypt and Gadhafi of Libya arguing that they should have consulted him on their joint initiative, given the role and progress of the IGAD peace process. However, the Egyptian-Libyan initiative collapsed before it could come to fruition.

The study findings indicated that the unquestionable Character of IGAD mediator helped in avoiding complains from the conflicting parties. According to the study, throughout the mediation exercise, none of the concerned actors questioned the legitimacy of IGAD to mediate in the conflict. This enhanced IGAD's position as a regional organization and gave it a *locus standi* which enabled it to communicate with the parties and finally bring about the CPA in 2005.

According to Adar, *et. al.*, (2004) the mediator was well versed with the issues at hand and understood the causes of the Sudan conflict and the interests of the warring parties. IGAD's enunciation of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 1994 was innovative as it provided a structure for the negotiations. According to Seii (2004) the DOP identified the key points of disagreement among the parties which included the separation of state and religion, the right to self-determination for the South, the system of governance during the interim period, the sharing of resources, and, security arrangements (Seii, 2004).

According to Sumbeiywo, (2006), the mediator was found to be immovable and stayed on course despite Khartoum's criticism and abandonment of the peace process for thirty-three months. Essentially what the Declaration of Principles did was to offer a reasonable alternative to the South, one that the southerners could identify with, given the history of broken promises from the North.

Adar *et. al.*, (2004) argued that the DOP as steered by the mediator, while offering the right of self-determination to the south, still spoke of a united Sudan and the option of an independent Southern Sudan would only come about if all other efforts failed. If the southerners felt that their needs were not catered for during the interim period, then they had a right to determine their own destiny, steadfast adherent by the authority to the DOP meant that the Khartoum government was increasingly viewed by major sections of the international community as a stumbling block to the peace process.

5.3 Round Table Conference

In order to assist the parties in their discussions the mediators drew a two-week programme of lectures and seminars. These seminars and lectures were very beneficial to the participants both for the principals and their representatives Experts and distinguished resource persons from the UK, Norway, USA, South Africa and Kenya, delivered lectures and shared their experiences

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with the parties. These were followed by comments, questions and discussions by the participants. The main focus of the lectures and seminars were on structures of government, and wealth sharing during the interim period (Formal interview in IGAD liaison office on 12th May 2019).

As Cheney (2006) puts it, he agrees with the respondent in that he explains that in a round table conference lectures and seminars are important because they give insight to the parties and actors engaged in the mediation process that acts as a guide on how to forge forward in the process as they are able to listen to all parties and create room to interrogate the issues at hand hence the mediators and resource persons can then use the proceedings to come up with a draft paper, the draft protocol on power sharing within a Broad Based framework like was the case with Sudan where it was agreed on how to share power as well as the sharing of the resources between the two factions.. This also gave focus on the organization of government and the creation of institutions at the national, state and Southern Sudan Levels. In line with the above, most of the respondents agreed that:

Sumbeiywo (2006) explores and gives an insight on how the Naivasha process was characterized by high-level consultations and negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA/M leaderships. The process began in September 2003 with the warring factions being led by their leaders for the first time when the government of Sudan delegation was led by the First vice president of the Sudan, Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, and the leader of SPLM/A Dr. John Garang de Mabior. A lot of issues were resolved during the process, particularly on security arrangements and wealth sharing.

As Blanchard, (2014) explains, on issues regarding ceasefire as a key component in the realization of peace. He further argues that the outcome of a round table deliberation is binding, as was evidenced in the Sudan conflict where it was agreed that the SPLM/A would undertake to demobilize Southern Sudanese soldiers apart from those serving in SAF in Southern Sudan and to absorb them into various institutions of the government of Southern Sudan.

Further, no armed group allied to either party was to be allowed to operate outside the two forces and those who desired and qualified were to be incorporated into the organized forces of either party (army, police, prisons and wildlife forces), while the rest were to be re-integrated into the civil service and civil society institutions. In this regard, the parties agreed to address the status of other armed groups in the country with a view to achieving comprehensive peace and stability and to realize full inclusiveness in the transition process.

Mutuku (2009) reveals that the outcome of the round table included the principles of proportional downsizing of the forces of both sides, at a suitable time following the completion of comprehensive ceasefire arrangements, which were agreed upon and an internationally monitored ceasefire was to come into effect from the date of the signature of a comprehensive peace agreement. The two parties together with the IGAD mediators and international experts were to work out details of the ceasefire agreement.

Although the round table strategy is useful, the warring factions might use it negatively as a means of re-arming and re-strategizing as Lesch, (1993) explains that on November 10 1964, the Sudanese government announced its desire for peace and negotiation, declared a general amnesty, and sent two southern members of its cabinet to Uganda to explain the new

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government's objective and to persuade Southern leaders to return. Beginning from March 1965, the Sudanese Prime Minister, Sir el-Kharim –el-Khalifa, called a Round Table peace conference to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

The conference between Khartoum and the South which was represented by the Sudan African National Union (SANU) had observers from Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria and Egypt. The Round Table Conference seem to have given Khartoum time to reorganize as none of its recommendations were ever implemented, including questions such as the creation of a Southern Development Agency. The failure of the conference's resolutions can be attributed to the government, which, over a period of time, showed a lack of interest in the peace process, reneged on its commitment to a new constitution, and demonstrated a preference to resolve the conflict militarily. Although the round table was useful, especially in the first and the second attempt in resolving the Sudan conflict in 1972 and subsequently 1994, exposed some weaknesses in the use of this strategy in that the round table conference of 1964 announced its desire for peace and negotiation thereby declaring a general amnesty particularly to the southerners who had sought refuge in Uganda, but did not highlight the issues that they would specifically address (Nyot, 1993). In fact, they even failed to implement the resolutions discussed in the conference for example the constitutional relationship between the North and the South, the resettlement of refugees and the creation of Southern Development Agency.

Coercive Diplomacy

With the combination of regional isolation and the support of the military in the neighboring countries to help SPLM/A, which culminated in victories in the field, the government in Khartoum As Kwasi (2011) asserts there is need to exploit all possible avenues that there would be in a mediation process in order to reach the end goal which is peace. Sudan's acceptance of the IGAD mediation process in late 1993 owes much to Khartoum's concern throughout the first half of 1993 about a possible US intervention in the country. That anxiety was a result of the close cooperation between the UN and the US in addressing the situation in Somalia.

According to Mitchel, (2003) through the instigation of the US, the UN put Sudan on a Special Rapporteur status due to its human rights record agrees on this matter regarding the view of the United States on Sudan:

The United States has had a lot of interest in the development of the Sudan peace process and followed closely the steps being taken by IGAD to bring the entire process to a conclusive end. The United States was particularly alert on the internal affairs of the Khartoum government because there was a general feeling since the 2001 bombing of the twin towers in the United States, Khartoum could have contributed either directly or indirectly. The U. S was also a strong sympathizer with the people of the south particularly with their leader, the late John Garang for his relentless effort to see his people exercise freedom from oppression (An in-depth interview in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Kenya on 7th June 2019).

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Andrew (2012) asserts that the engagement of the United States of America in the management of the Sudan conflict provided impetus in the push of the initiative forward at a time when it seemed to have stalled. For instance, the US engagement in Sudan steadily increased from President Clinton's Executive Order of November 1997 which imposed comprehensive trade and economic sanctions to the early 2000 US legislation which banned any company doing business in Sudan's oil industry from participation in the US capital markets, through to the Sudan Peace Act of October 2002. This economic sanction stipulated further sanctions if the Sudanese government was found not to be participating in the peace negotiations in good faith. A further demonstration of US pressure can be seen in the fact that throughout the Clinton administration, the US appeared quite sympathetic to John Garang and the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright met him twice.

As Keen (2007) explains, President George w. Bush appointed special peace envoy, Senator John Clagget Danforth (Missouri), in 2001. This was no doubt, a sign of the U S unwavering commitment to the Sudan peace process. This combined with the heightened concerns about international terrorism after 11 September and contributed to the increased engagement of the US in Sudan and led to other donors such as the UK, joining the peace process.

As Saleem (2011) notes, more pressure was brought to bear on Khartoum by Sudan being identified as one of seven countries on a State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism after September 11. This study argues that there can be little doubt that collectively these measures by the most powerful country in the world sent a powerful message to Khartoum government to bring the war to an end. Indeed, the Sudan Peace Act had authorized the US President to provide increased assistance to the areas of Sudan not controlled by Khartoum to prepare the population for peace and democratic governance, including support for civil administration, communications infrastructure, education, health and agriculture. The Act also recognized that a resolution to the conflict was best made through a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya on 20th July 1994 and the Machakos Protocol of July 2002.

In spite of the varied views of some of the Sudanese populace that the international actors had their own interests in the entire peace process particularly the West, the US administration repeatedly made it clear that it supported regional efforts led by IGAD, according to Francis (2006). The special peace envoy from the U.S, Danforth proposed a series of confidence-building measures, comprising a cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains, zones and times of tranquility in which vaccinations and other humanitarian interventions could be carried out, a commission to report on the issue of slavery and an end to attacks on civilian targets – all of which achieved some, but not complete compliance.

Whether or not these measures increased mutual confidence between the government and the SPLM/A is questionable, and whether or not these developments were fully supported by the Sudanese people would still be questionable but they did suggest that there could be substantial positive development in the Sudan peace process. As Weber& Ajak, (2014) notes, neither party wanted to run afoul of the US, particularly given its great concern over the matters touching on security after 11 September and its demonstrated willingness to use military force to pursue any real or perceived security interests. For instance, Danforth and increased US pressure on

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Khartoum post-dated the collapse of the IGAD sponsored peace talks at Lake Bogoria in Kenya in October 2000. However, by then it had become increasingly clear to both the IGAD mediators and the IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF) that outside support and pressure, ideally led by the US, would be necessary if the peace process was not to come to a complete halt.

Although the IGAD Peace Initiative had some genuine accomplishments a well-thought-out Declaration of Principles (DOP), workable relations with the belligerents, an institutional focus in the Sudan Secretariat, and international legitimacy it had become apparent to most analysts and the belligerents by late 2001 that the process demanded enhancement, and this could only come through international engagement led by the US so that there could be substantial pressure which would drive the other parties towards a meaningful end.

In the late 2004 when the final agreement was proving difficult to negotiate, Sumbeiyio & Waihenya (2006) asserts that US pressure proved invaluable in pushing the parties towards agreement. At that time the US was holding the Chairmanship of the Security Council and Senator Danforth, was the Chairman. Danforth suggested that the UN Security Council meeting should be brought to Nairobi, on the pretext of concerns over the war in Darfur, in order to give the peace, process the much-needed reinforcement. Once the Council arrived there was a dramatic change in the spirit of the negotiations. A meeting between the Council and the two belligerents confirmed 31st December 2004 as the final day of negotiations and 7th January 2005 as the day of signing the agreements, dates which the two parties had not been willing to endorse earlier as they continued to negotiate amid mutual suspicion and hostility.

Jeong, (2008) evidence also suggests a disturbing trend from the US, which sometimes slowed down the momentum towards final agreement between the parties. According to Sumbeiyio, Kenya's Special Envoy to the peace talks and the lead mediator, the Americans, once they were committed to the process, wanted to micro-manage it and take all the credit for its eventual success. It does seem that the US prematurely desired the secession of Southern Sudan or the right to self-determination as an option at a time in the process when such an idea was not yet acceptable to Khartoum. For instance, in the negotiations at Machakos, Kenya in June 2002, the mediators had to come up with a single negotiating text that would act as a starting point and cover the broad outlines on the main issues including the transition period, the pre-transition period, and the equitable sharing of natural resources. The US envoy was furious that the text did not refer to the right to self-determination or secession and he simply walked out and the SPLM/A followed suit.

Further, the US never committed any sizeable fund to the process yet demanded a sizeable part of it. In fact, the reason for the US rejection of the negotiating text at Machakos was simply the fact that Washington had not been contacted yet Washington 'supposedly' wanted to be informed of everything that was going on. For instance, the first draft that led to the Machakos Protocol, the single negotiating text, which was signed on June 20, 2002, was rejected out of hand by the Americans.

After the Machakos talks and concerned that the Chief Mediator, Sumbeiyio, was limiting the number of visitors to the talks, now at Naivasha, Kenya, then American Ambassador, William Bellamy, made his feelings known about the matter. "whether you like it or not," he told Sumbeiyio, "My government wants to know what is happening. I will come". When Bellamy

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came, he met each side separately. He had a message for them: they would sign the peace agreement at Naivasha but exchange the document at the White House. The general feeling from everyone was that having waited for the talks to collapse without success, the Americans now wanted to hijack the process at this crucial stage and claim victory.

5.5 Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement

This study holds that peace keeping and peace enforcement are two different concepts. Peace keeping is the behavior of trying to prevent fighting, especially of trying to prevent war between nations while peace enforcement means a situation of ensuring that the parties in dispute abide by the regulations and decisions proposed by a mediator who enjoys the use of force to guarantee compliance.

The international and regional organizations and individual states have a responsibility to engage in the Sudan conflict based on the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, to engage using force if necessary, to check gross violations of human rights according to Angoma (2014). As one of the interviewees explained that, on January 30, 1989 coup brought into government the hard-liner National Islamic Front (NIF) of Hassan Turabi. Despite the presence of this radical outfit in government, international pressure due to concerns about suffering civilians led to the ceasefire to enable humanitarian intervention. There was no written agreement between the parties to the conflict with the UN when the international organization launched Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) on April 1, 1989 to assist civilian victims of the conflict, but there was an informal agreement that both protagonists maintain a ceasefire in order to allow relief food to reach civilians.

Francis (2006) notes, it was necessary to reinforce the Memorandum of Understanding to avoid a violation of the same. This being a major concern particularly by the SPLM/A which had witnessed the Khartoum government engage in the violation in the past, the MOU was later reinforced by an addendum to it after repeated violations. The Addendum, among other things, allowed for the establishment of a Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT). The VMT was given the mandate to travel to any area where a violation was reported and filed by any of the parties and make its findings public to IGAD and the international community. Both the MoU and the Addendum contributed to upholding the cease-fire and subsequently created an environment for negotiations.

Nguyen (2002) points out four conditions necessary for a regional organization to be an effective mediator: legitimacy, enforcement power, resources and cooperation. Legitimacy refers to the regional organization getting mandated fully by the stake holders while enforcement power refers to the organization's ability to carry out its peace plans and to impose its decisions and will on the disputants. This is needed throughout the process of conflict resolution to persuade disputants to compromise and cooperate in the initial stages and to ensure that parties comply with agreements and their responsibilities once the fighting has ended. The author however notes that, it is rare for regional organizations to possess this capability. Resources refer to the ability of a regional organization to sponsor the peace process or bear most of the costs.

Cooperation concerns the importance of a close relationship between a regional organization and the United Nations or the other actors which include the major powers in

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resolving the conflict. In fact, experience during the cold war shows that without major power support, regional organizations play only a marginal role in conflict resolution. This is due to the fact that though most regional organizations are willing, able and motivated to participate in conflict resolution, they are often constrained by the small size of their member states, the non-inclusive nature of their membership and the partiality of their coverage.

In conclusion, regional organizations sometimes play only a marginal role, their efforts limited to making available their good offices to disputants. This is because their roles are not clearly defined when it comes to the issues of conflict resolution. It is not an exaggeration to say that the United Nations has over the years enjoyed near monopoly power in conflict settlement through mediation, peacekeeping or forceful military intervention. This is a luxury that IGAD as a mediator has not enjoyed and that is why they have greatly refrained from using peace keeping and peace enforcement.

5.6 Good office for good work

As a strategy, good offices for good works mainly address matters on early warning systems. Therefore, it must identify grievances in advance to deter a full-blown conflict. It relies on a mediator who may be an individual, a small group of individuals, an organization, or a government. All of them, however, must share an interest in resolving the conflict.

According to Assefa (1997), the movement for colonial freedom (MCF), a London based organization affiliated with the Parliamentary Labor Party, also attempted to mediate in the conflict in the early 1970s. The MCF had been established in the 1930s in order to raise British consciousness about the colonial territories and to provide a platform for indigenous leaders from these colonies to present their cases. Beginning from January 1970 the MCF attempted to use its good offices to bring about some kind of rapprochement between exiled southerners and the Sudanese government.

The MCF arranged for various delegations comprising of British parliamentarians and trade unionists to visit Sudan with the aim of gathering facts and sensitizing British public opinion about the situation in Sudan. However, the conclusion of the MCF after the visit was that the rebellion ‘was being fomented and encouraged by external reactionary forces which were anxious to prevent unity and progress towards a socialist Sudan.’ The leaders of the southern movement concluded from the MCF’s statement that it was committed to support the government of Gaafar Numeiry, at that time a socialist, and hence ended MCF’s involvement in the peace process.

While one of the interviewees explained the intervention of the religious groups in providing good offices for good works in the Sudan during the period of the conflict. Most of the respondents had however a divergence view in that they felt that early intervention was not provided to avert the conflict or avoid altogether.

Zartman and Touval (1991) have asserted that mediation has been a frequent occurrence within the international system for at least 200 years. Further, they argue that although the end of the cold war brought about many changes in international politics, it neither reduced the incidence of international conflicts nor the tendency to submit them to mediation hence the

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relevance of the IGAD mediation process in the Sudan peace process and the need to consider the provision of good offices for good works.

Given such an exposition of the protractedness and the major causes of internal conflicts in Africa, and particularly the horn, it follows that any attempt at resolving them necessitates a comprehensive understanding of their nature and dynamics. Different scholars have examined various ways of peacefully resolving disputes. Article 33 of the UN Charter enumerates such methods as negotiations, good offices, mediation, inquiry, conciliation, arbitration and litigation. Each of these methods has its advantages and disadvantages. One conclusion, however, seems to be clear from the prevailing discussions with regard to internal wars: that short of an outright victory by one party mediation may be the best way of helping to resolve such conflicts as civil wars, however mediation itself as a method of resolving conflicts has attracted various perspectives.

The North-South conflict in Sudan has been Africa's longest running civil war. Throughout the period of the conflict various mediation efforts were made by different actors ranging from international non-governmental organizations, churches, individuals, states and even multinational corporations like Lonrho through its chief executive, all without success. The only notable exception was the initiative by the World Council of Churches and its African affiliate, All African Conference of Churches (AACC), which resulted in the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord that brought peace to Sudan for eleven years (1972-1983).

As a result of the structural asymmetry of internal conflicts, mediators must combine the most intrusive of the mediation roles manipulation with the other two, communication and formulation. As communicators, mediators merely carry messages, overcoming the procedural communications gap between parties as formulators; mediators put forward their own ideas about possible outcomes, overcoming the substantive communications gap but manipulators. The inclusiveness of good offices for good works involves the sharpening of the stalemate and the sweetening and overcoming the substantive communication gap, as well as sweetening the proposed outcomes.

The most important key to obtaining welcome is leverage, which comes in three forms. It is achieved either by the provision of side payments that turn the zero-sum game positive, or by the delivery of each side's agreement to an outcome that the other side can find attractive, or by a threat to end the mediation process through withdrawal or taking sides. This study argues that the success of good office for good works depends on persuading the parties to change their perceptions of the value of the current situations and future outcomes, that means to see a stalemate and reach a turning point.

In conclusion this study indicated that good office for good works is preventive diplomacy and it is about building trust and the space to be able to engage while it is all about building consensus and it is not something that can be imposed, if it has to bring about a meaning and a beneficial end to the conflicting parties.

5.7 Use of state and non-state actors

Not only states but also other third parties are active in peace mediation over the decades, international organizations and non-governmental organizations in particular have assumed an

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increasingly important role in the field of peace mediation in Sudan, stepping up their cooperation with states.

Prior to IGAD intervention, there were attempts to resolve the conflict notably with the World Church Council and the All African Council of Churches which culminated into the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement which brought peace to Sudan for eleven years. The position of IGAD in expressing its objective in facilitating an inclusive Sudanese peace process was laudable. This was because including other stakeholders in the process was seen as fundamental to the attainment of a sustainable peace. As Paffenholz (2006) notes, when all the stakeholders are engaged in bringing different but yet substantive perspectives together, there is the likelihood of eradicating some potential spoilers by bringing a wide range of the societal efforts together. From the respondents, the role of state and non-state actors was noted to be providing Technical capacity, financial assistance, humanitarian assistance and lobbying and sanctions.

In Sudan, the non-state actors, both the NGOs (either international or local) as well as the International Governmental Organizations like the UN, EU and IGAD, provided Technical capacity in form of using peace Ambassadors, use of Envoys and provision of alternative strategies and methods that would fast track the resolution of the conflict in the Sudan. Some of the state and non-state actors provided financial support in jumpstarting the process of realizing peace in Sudan for example the Republic of Kenya where the former president of Kenya facilitated the financing of the IGAD secretariat at the elementary stages of the organization on how to jumpstart the resolution of the Sudan conflict. Some of these non-state actors have operated in conflict zones in Sudan providing humanitarian assistance like food, makeshift shelters, medicine and psychological counseling. Besides, they have been instrumental in highlighting and exposing the suffering of the people of Sudan through local and international media while calling for speedy resolution of the conflict.

The state and the non-state actors have also lobbied for creation of safe havens within the conflict zones like Darfur where civilians may get the basic services and food and healthcare. In some instances, they have influenced perpetrators of the conflict to face sanctions and even face international justices, where the rights of the populations have suffered immense violations.

The intervention of the state and non-state actors in the Sudan conflict was significant for peace to be realized. As much as various interventions had been put in place with little success in the formative years of the conflict, as Faber, (2007), puts it that in 1963, Milton Obote the then president of Uganda offered to mediate in the conflict although there was not much progress that was realized, as well as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. However, it set a road map for further future interventions.

The study found out that there was a lot of input from both the state and the non-state actors for example the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF), which was based in London attempted to mediate the Sudan conflict in the 1970s, according to Assefa (2007), as well as the World Council of Churches (WCC) and its regional affiliate, the All African Council of Churches (AACC) which made the 1972 peace agreement possible in Sudan. This created relative peace in Sudan for eleven years up to 1983. Bentley & Southall (2005) observes that the Jimmy Carter Peace Initiative was paramount it led to a ceasefire that enabled and created an environment for humanitarian intervention.

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The study observes that, the role of state and non-state actors is crucial since they bring in expertise, financial assistance and some level of pressure which is useful in resolving the conflicts, although their activities might be sometimes misunderstood or misinterpreted by victims, states and perpetrators of the conflict.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion IGAD utilizes a number of strategies in the management of conflicts in the Horn of Africa, which include the use of diplomatic circles in conflict management, personality mediation, round table conference, coercive diplomacy, peace keeping and peace enforcement, use of good office for good work and the use of state and non-state actors. These terms IGAD's objective as successful because to some point the strategies laid have contributed to peace and further formation of the South Sudan state, a significant symbolization of freedom.

It is recommended that, IGAD as well as other regional organizations like SADC, ECOWAS, and other sub-regional organizations should adopt preventive mechanisms where they act on information generated from early warning systems as opposed to intervening when the conflict is on course. Early warning systems are important because they act as key component in conflict reduction programs, thereby reducing the loss of lives and property.

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